HOW THE COMMUNISTS HELPED TO BRING ON PEARL HARBOR AND OPEN UP ASIA TO COMMUNIZATION
By Anthony Kubek, University of Dallas
Throughout Soviet history China has been one of its main considerations. That was dinned in the ears of the Communists over and over again — the importance of China with its great reservoir of manpower. In 1932, Sergei Ivanovich Gussev, who had served as Comintern agent and Stalin's personal representative in the United States, "commanded the Communists in the United States to take up four tasks. Two of them were the defence of the Soviet Union and the furtherance of Red conquest of China." In 1933 the notorious Gerhert Eisler "was secretly sent into the United States by Moscow to make sure these orders were carried out."
In 1935, Georgi Dimitrov was General Secretary of the Comintern. At the 15th Anniversary of the Communist Party of China he laid down the Communist line to the followers:
...as a real Bolshevik Party, the Communist Party of China realizes that however great the successes it has achieved, they are only the first serious steps on the road to the liberation of the Chinese people...
The Party... is faced with the task of carrying on a systematic struggle to establish a united national front with the Kuomintang...
It is necessary that energetic measures be taken to exert pressure on public opinion and the governments, first and foremost in England, France, and the U.S.A.
The Soviet Union properly evaluated the importance of the United States in any Communist scheme for conquest of China. The American government was to influence Chinese events in a decisive manner. In 1939 Lauchlin Currie was appointed "Administrative Assistant to the President." He was empowered to coordinate "the work of the various departments in their relations to the Executive." For this purpose he was located in the offices of the White House, "on the White House telephone." Shortly before he embarked on his China mission early in 1941, Currie called on Stanley K. Hornbeck at the State Department. He informed him that Chiang Kai-shek had requested that President Roosevelt select an American advisor for him. The President had decided to nominate Owen Lattimore. When Dr. Hornbeck discovered that Secretary Hull had not been consulted on this matter he "expressed doubt whether an assumption by the President of responsibility for such a nomination was a wise procedure and whether the nomination of Mr. Lattimore was a suitable nomination." He asked who had suggested Lattimore to the President. Currie replied that he had, whereupon Hornbeck answered: "It should be an easy matter to effect a reconsideration." Unmoved, Currie was confident it was "a suitable nomination, and that, in any event, there could be no reconsideration inasmuch as the nomination had already been sent to Chiang Kai-shek." After his return from Chungking, Currie urged that "before taking any action" the President seek to obtain Lattimore's confidence. This was "most important."
President Roosevelt was favorable to the choice of Owen Lattimore as his advisor to the Generalissimo. Now it remained for him to obtain the concurrence of his Secretary of State for Currie's recommendation. "It sounds good to me," he wrote. Hull, obviously annoyed at not having been consulted on the matter of the selection, replied curtly that he had "no objection." Currie then informed the Generalissimo that Lattimore was "a person admirably equipped for the post." Shortly afterwards Lattimore had a long conversation with Soviet Ambassador Oumansky. Dr. Carter "thought it was pretty important for him... in view of his job and the evolving world situation. It was a most illuminating 2 hours." On the same day President Roosevelt notified Chiang Kai-Shek of his complete confidence in his new advisor. "I have the highest opinion of his capabilities and I know that he is intimate with and in complete accord with my basic politcal attitudes." Did the President suspect what his real views were?
Lattimore had spent many years in China. During the late thirties he is supposed to have frequently expressed "his warm admiration for the Chinese Communists." They constituted for him the wave of the future and "represented the real people." He advocated general support for Soviet foreign policy, but opposed "using their slogans" or giving anyone "an impression of subserience." Lattimore was spoken of as one of "our men" by General Bersin. He was one of the two Americans who was suggested as a prospective candidate for Soviet intelligence. Louis Budenz testified Lattimore had been hand picked "to change the thinking here in Washington and in America on the Communist activities in China and relations to the Soviet Union." Lattimore was thought to be a man "who could put out propaganda and conceal the Communist activity, but still have it carry out the policy of the Communists." According to Budenz "the weight of his discussions was alwaye along the lines of the Soviet policy," but the language employed 'Was non-Soviet in character. "
The appointment of Oven Lattimore as "a special advisor to the Chinese Government" was announced in the New York Times on June 29, 1941. The news was warmly received in China and not merely by the Nationalists. Chou En-lai "was pleased to learn of Mr. Lattimore's selection." It was "obvious" he believed Lattimore "might have a sympathetic attitude toward the Chinese Communists."
Meanwhile on June 22 Germany's invasion of Russia was to have important repercussions in the Far East. Foreign Minister Matsuoka of Japan felt deeply committed to the Germans and was much impressed by the new vistas opened for Japan by the Nazi-Soviet conflict. Early in May, 1941, he had assured the German Ambassador in Japan that "no Japanese Premier or Foreign Minister would ever be able to keep Japan neutral in the event of a German-Russian conflict. In this case, Japan would be driven, by the force of necessity, to attack Russia at Germany's side. No neutrality pact would change that at all.' The Japanese Foreign Ministry now blandly told the Soviet Ambassador in Japan that if the Tripartite (Axis) Pact and Japan's Neutrality Agreement with the Soviet Union should prove at variance with each other, the latter would have to be dropped.
The German invasion of Russia presented Japan with a golden opportunity to launch an assault on Soviet Siberia to eliminate once and for all the threat of Communist power. Germany began to apply pressure to obtain Japan'a declaration of war against the Soviet Union. Ambassador Ott in Tokyo was instructed to advise the Japanese that they had a "unique opportunity for the new order in East Asia by going to war with the Soviet Union. After the elimination of Soviet power in Asia, the solution of the China question would have no difficulty." Ott handed the message to Matsuoka, who was in full agreement with it and said that he would bring it to the attention of the army and navy officials and the Emperor.
By-passing the Prime Minister, Matsuoka hurried to the Imperial Palace to expound his grand design, but only to meet with a cool reception. Meanwhile, in order to be ready to take full advantage of the eventual collapse of Soviet Russia, it was decided to hasten the reinforcement of Japanese troops in Manchuria in the hope that, if the Kremlin was obliged to withdraw part of her army from the far East, Japan would be in a superior military position, if necessary, to strike.
On July 2 an Imperial Conference was held in Tokyo and it was decided not to move against the Soviet Union through Siberia, but instead to prosecute a plan of advance into Indo-China and Siam at the risk of war with the United States and Great Britain. With regards to the German-Soviet conflict, Japan would continue to observe her Neutrality Pact. Should the war go in Germany's favor, however, Japan would then intervene "to secure stability in the northern regions." The possibility of a Japanese attack, or of a joint German-Japanese evasion through Siberia, was a spector that haunted Soviet officials. Invasion of Siberia, however, offered no material advantage to Japan, other than a purely military one. Japan needed oil, and with the United States constantly applying economic pressure, it was to her advantage to move in the direction of Southeast Asia, where oil was available. This was the view strongly advocated by the Japanese naval officials.
In this connection, it is important to note that the Kremlin was promptly informed by its master spy, Richard Sorge, of the Japanese decision of July 2, and especially of the postponement of the military operations into Siberia.
Sorge was attached to the German Embassy in Tokyo. His assistant was Hotsumi Ozaki, an adviser to the Japanese Premier. Mr. Ozaki was aided by Kimkazu Saionji, Secretary of the Japanese Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Mitsusada Yoshikawa, Director of the Special Investigation Bureau of the Attorney General's office of the Japanese Government testified before the Committee on Un-American Activities that Sorge, working through Ozaki and Saionji, sought to impress on the Japanese officials that if they struck north, their forces would encounter powerful Red armies, there would be little of value in Siberia, and she would probably meet greater difficulties than in her war with China. If Japan struck south, it was pointed out, she would find many useful resources. Besides, Japan historically has always failed in any military missions toward the north.
Sorge had become very friendly with Mrs. Ott, wife of the German Ambassador to Tokyo. This source of information enabled Sorge to report to the Kremlin the dialogues exchanged between Konoye and Ott on relations with the Soviet Union and Japan. Sorge's last report to Moscow before his discovery and arrest in mid-October stated that there was no serious danger of an attack from Manchuria, that the Japanese would move south, and that war with the United States and Britain was probable before the end of the year. Russian officials were able to breathe a sigh of relief.
The significance of Japan's decision to move south instead of against the Soviet Union cannot be overestimated. V. Kravchenko, a high Soviet official and an eyewitness before he defected to the United States, describes how Soviet Far Eastern troops were able to stem the tide against the German advance into Russia. He wrote: "Beginning with the nineteenth (October, 1941), the situation improved. The first seasoned Siberian and Far Eastern forces began to arrive... Far Eastern troops, hardened in border struggle with the Japanese, and Siberian forces inured to winter warfare were rushing westward across a continent to hold the invaders."
Meanwhile, in August, 1941, Prime Minister Konoye, realizing the situation with the United States was getting worse, made a proposal to meet with President Roosevelt at Honolulu. Ambassador Grew was so deeply impressed with the sincerity of Konoye's plea that he immediately sent a dispatch to Secretary Hull and urged, "with all the force at his command, for the sake of avoiding the obviously growing possibility of an utterly futile war between Japan and the United States, that this Japanese proposal not be turned aside without very prayerful consideration.... The opportunity is here presented... for an act of the highest statesmanship... with the possible overcoming thereby of apparently insurmountable obstacles to peace hereafter in the Paciffic."
There was "little doubt" that Konoye "would appealfor American cooperation in bringing the China affair to a closeand would probably be prepared to give far-reaching undertakings in that connection, involvinp also the eventual withdrawal of Japanese forces from Indo-China." The "time element" was "important because the rapid acceleration given by recent American economy measures to the deterioration of Japan's economic life will tend progressively to weaken rather than to strengthen the moderate elements in the country and the hand of the present Cabinet and to reinforce the extremists." In Grew's opinion the "most important aspect of the proposed meeting" was that if the results were "not wholly favorable," there would, nonetheless, be "a definite opportunity to prevent the situation in the Far East from getting rapidly worse." On August 26, Ambassador Nomura received an urgent message which expressed an almost frantic desire to arrange a meeting between the leaders of the two countries. The instruction stated: "Now the international as well as our internal situation is strained in the extreme and we have reached the point where we will pin our last hope on an interview between the Premier and the President." Two days later the Japanese Ambassador handed President Roosevelt Konoye's proposal for a meeting to "take place as soon as possible." It was rejected.
Since the end of 1940 our Ambassador in Tokyo had pressed for a "thorough re-examination of our approach to the problems of the Far East and a redefinition of the main immediate objectives to be pursued by American diplomacy." Both he and the entire embassy staff were convinced the problem "could never be solved by formulas drawn up in the exploratory conversations." They believed the problem "could and would be solved if the proposed meeting between Prince Konoye and the President should take place." When Ambassador Grew urged President Roosevelt to make a speech at the earliest possible moment in order that the Japanese public would gain knowledge of our true intentions, his "recommendation was not carried out." "Why?" Grew asked: "History will wish to know." In his opinion this gesture "might well have turned the whole trend in Japan at this critical time." Following the outbreak of war Grew asked the Secretary why Konoye's important proposal had not been accepted. Hull answered: "If you thought so strongly, why didn't you board a plane and come to tell us?" The Ambassador reminded him of the urgent telegrams he had repeatedly sent the Department. Suddenly, he "wondered whether Mr. Hull had been given and had read all of the dispatches from Tokyo." There is "no evidence" in the official correspondence of either a "desire or of efforts on the part of our Government to simplify Prince Konoye's difficult task or to meet him even part way." Ambassador Grew assured the President that Konoye was willing to "go as far as possible, without incurring open rebellion in Japan to reach a reasonable understanding with us." He pleaded his case with courage and determination:
It seems to me highly unlikely that this chance will come again or that any Japanese statesman other than Prince Konoye could succeed in controlling the military extremists in carrying through a policy which they, in their ignorance of international affairs and economic laws, resent and oppose. The alternative to reaching a settlement now would be the greatly increased probability of war, — Facilis descensus Averno est — and while we would undoubtedly win in the end, I question whether it is in our own interest to see an impoverished Japan reduced to the position of a third-rate Power.
A memorandum was prepared in the Far Eastern Division of the Department of State which attempted to evaluate the arguments, pro and con, regarding the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting. Mr. Joseph Ballantine arrived at the conclusion that arguments against the meeting outweighed those in favor of it. It was feared that if we entered into negotiations with Japan, Chinese morale might be "seriously impaired." In this event "it would probably be most difficult to revive in China the psychology necessary to continue effective resistance against Japan." Lauchlin Currie strongly emphasized this viewpoint. He was unalterably opposed to an American agreement with Japan because it "would do irreparable damage to the good will we have built up in China." Moreover, it was pointed out that the British, Dutch and other Governments would entertain "misgivings" about America's will to resist. This could result in a "breakdown in their efforts to maintain a firm front against Japan." Mr. Ballantine expressed the view that "such a meeting would create illusions for the Japanese people the wide discrepancy between the viewpoints of the American and the Japanese Governments." Ambassador Grew seemed to be of the opinion such a meeting would, on the contrary, dispel such illusions. What he thought necessary "was a dramatic gesture, something that would electrify the people both in Japan and in the United States and would give impetus to an entirely new trend of thought and policy." Finally, the Ballantine memorandum stated: "The effect of such a meeting upon the American public would in all probability be unfavorable, particularly among those which have exhibited an uncompromising stand on the question of stopping Japanese aggression."
Secretary Hull rejected the idea of a Konoye-Roosevelt meeting and ramarked to Ambassador Nomura that before there could be a meeting between the President and Prince Konoye, there would first have to be an agreement upon basic principles of policy. He knew that such an agreement was not possible. In other circumstances, Hull's reason might have had validity; in the unique circumstances of the Konoye offer, it had none. The meat of the Konoye offer was that the Emperor would act; preliminary negotiations would serve only to make the Emperor's action doubtful.
The British attitude was generally affirmative with regards to the Konoye offer. They presumed it would serve their interests of securing Singapore and maintaining the stabilization of Southeast Asia. Actually, of course, war did result in the loss of Singapore. However, the record indicates that Sir Robert Craigie, British Ambassador in Tokyo, was "firmly of the opinion" that the Roosevelt-Konoye meeting should be held. In his view "it would be a foolish policy if this superb opportunity is permitted to slip by assuming an unduly suspicious attitude."  According to Duff Cooper,Ambassador Craigie stated to the Foreign Office shortly before the fall of Konoye Cabinet "Time suitable for realpeace with Japan. Hope this time American cynicism will not be allowed to interfere with realistic statesmanship."
Hard-pressed Chinese stood to benefit from failure of conference and from involvement of Japan in war with the United States. China could win only in the peace following a war. Ambassador Gauss believed it was "indeed vital" to "give China all the support we can in her fight against Japanese aggression." In a message which was received in Washington following the outbreak of war, he wrote:
At the same time I believe that it is important that we bear in mind that the defeat of Japanese aggression does not necessarily entail, as many Chinese think, our crushing Japan militarily. The complete elimination of Japan as a force in the Far East would not be conducive either to order or prosperity in this area.
With the rejection of Konoye's offer, Richard Sorge dismantled his spy apparatoe, confident both of a Japanese war against the United States and Great Britain, and of continued Japanese neutrality towards the Soviet Union. This suggests a motive for Communist agents in Washington. If Sorge had penetrated far enough into the Japanese military establishment (as he seems to have done) to be certain that a preponderance of Japanese admirals would never fight a two-front war, the Soviet Union might conclude that precipitating an Anglo-American-Japanese war was a means of safeguarding Siberia. It is true that the U.S.S.R. constantly feared Great Britain would make a separate peace and received a great scare from Hess's flight to Scotland, and it is also true that Japan's attack on America would make a separate peace unlikely.
Major General Charles A. Willoughby, who was formerly American Intelligence Chief in the Far East, has testified that Prince Konoye "was desperately serious in effecting a last minute understanding with the United States." There werc certain "unidentified" persons in the United States who "were opposed to such an understanding."" There are two channels through which Communist agents might have exerted influence. One is Harry Hopkins and Lauchlin Currie. Hopkins, at this very time, took Currie on as deputy for Lend-Lease to China, and they were on very friendl terms. The other is the communist group in the Department of State, particularly Alger Hiss. Currie and one of the Hiss brothers were at this time, in daily consultation with Harry Dexter White.
Not only was sentiment within the Department of State generally unfavorable to the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting, the Treasury Department, which was to play an increasingly formative role in the development of American Far Eastern policy, voiced its firm opposition to any agreement with Japan. The President was warned of the hidden perils of "a new Munich." Harry Dexter White, who was in the habit of preparing notes to the President for Secretary Morgenthau to sign, submitted a spirited appeal for bolder action in the Far East:
Mr. President, word was brought to me yesterday evening that persons in our country's government are hoping to betray the cause of the heroic Chinese people and strike a deadly blow at all your plans for a world-wide democratic victory. I was told that the Japanese Embassy staff is openly boasting of a great triumph for the "New Order." Oil — rivers of oil — will soon be flowing to the Japanese war machines. A humiliated democracy in the Far East, China, Holland, Great Britain will soon be facing a Fascist coalition emboldened and strengthened by diplomatic victory. — So the Japanese are saying.
Mr. President, I am aware that many honest individuals argue that a Far East Munich is necessary at the moment. But I write this letter because millions of human beings everywhere in the world share with me the profound conviction that you will lead a suffering world to victory over the menace to all our lives and all of our liberties. To sell China to her enemies for the thirty blood-stained coins of gold will not only weaken our national policy in Europe as well as in the Far East, but will dim the bright lustre of America's world leadership in the great democratic fight against Fascism.
On this day, Mr. President, the whole country looks to you to save America's power as well as her sacred honor. I know — I have, the most perfect confidence — that should these stories be true, should there be Americans who seek to destroy your declared policy in world affairs, that you will succeed in circumventing these plotters of a new Munich."
Soviet Russia stood to gain vitally from U.S.-Japanese war. Roosevelt-Konoye in agreement would have left Japanese troops — indeed many more troops — as a potential threat to Siberia, immobilizing Soviet forces as far as the European war was concerned.
Although tension was mounting in Tokyo, Japanese officials did not lose hope that an agreement could be made to avert war. Ambassador Nomura was instructed to present a modus vivendi to the Secretary of State, but this was rejected when it became certain the Chinese and the British would not agree. However, Mr. Hull went ahead and drafted a modus vivendi of his own which President Roosevelt regarded as a "fair proposition" but he was "not very hopeful" of its success.
At noon on November 25, Secretaries Stimson and Knox met at the White House together with General Marshall and Admiral Stark. The discussion dealt mainly with the Japanese situation concerning the intercepted message fixing the November 29 deadline. The President "brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked, perhaps (as soon as) next Monday, for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning." The main question was "how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. It was a dificult proposition." This took place before Hull sent his ultimatum on November 26.
The next morning Stimson heard from Hull over the telephone that Hull had "about made up his mind" not to go through with his plan for a three months' truce, but, instead, to "kick the whole thing over" and tell the Japanese that he had no proposition at all. The decision for a modus vivendi was thus dropped and the President gave his blessing to the shelving of it in his morning interview with Hull on November 26.
The modus vivendi provided for a truce of three months during which time the United States and Japan agreed not to "advance by force or threat of force" in Southeastern and Northeastern Asia or in the southern and northern Pacific area. The Japanese agreed to withdraw their troops from Indo-China and to relax their freezing and export restrictions permitting the resumption of trade in embargoed articles. The United States modified its restrictions in the same way. The draft of the proposal declared: "The Government of the United States is earnestly desirous to contribute to the promotion and maintenance of peace in the Pacific area and to afford every opportunity for the continuances of discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of peace throughout the Pacific area." There had been "some progress" made in regard to "the general principles which constitute the basis of a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area." This proposal was never submitted to the Japanese Government.
Had a modus vivendi with Japan been reached, and it could have been reached with far fewer concessions at the expense of China than were later to be made to Soviet Russia at Yalta, almost certainly the war with Japan would thereby have been averted, in view of the German reverses in Russia in the winter of 1941-1942; there was also a growing conviction in Japanese military circles that Germany was in a death struggle in her war with Russia. In his testimony before the Congressional Committee investigating the attack on Pearl Harbor, General Marshall said that if the 90-day truce had been effected, the United States might never have become involved in the war at all; that a delay by the Japanese from December, 1941 into January, 1942 might have resulted in a change of Japanese opinion as to the wisdom of the attack because of the collapse of the German front before Moscow in December, 1941.
Why did Secretary Hull change his mind about a modus vivendi? It is difficult to get a precise sequence of events which led to the final decision. However, factors which must have influenced the decision were the strong protests from the Chinese and Mr. Churchill's views which were received during the night of November 25. Another factor which cannot be dismissed was the pressure exerted by Harry Dexter White. As soon as word of Secretary Hull's offer of a modus vivendi leaked out, Harry Dexter White took precipitate action. A letter signed "Henry Morgenthau, Jr." was dispatched to President Roseevelt on the 24th or 25th of November. His words told of the dire consequences that would come in the wake of any agreement with Japan. They nearly trembled with emotion. "After our long association, I need not tell you that this is not written in any doubt of your objectives, but I feel and fear that if the people, our people, and all the oppressed people of the earth, interpret your move as an appeasement of repressive forces, as a move that savors strongly of 'selling out China' for a temporary respite, a terrible blow will have been struck against those very objectives." The President was reminded of the "supreme part" he was "to play in world affairs." This role could be played "with complete effectiveness if only [he] retain[ed] the people's confidence in [his] courage and steadfastness in the face of aggression, and in the face of the blandishments of temporary advantages." The letter continued:
It is because of your forthright and unyielding stand, it is because you are the one statesman whose record has never been besmirched by even a trace of appeasement that the United States holds its unique and supreme position in world affairs today. Not the potential power of our great country, but your record, Mr. President, has placed the United States and you, its titular head and spokesman, in a position to exercise the leading force which will bring ultimate victory over aggression and Fascism.
Mr. President, I want to explain in language as strong as I can command, my feeling that the need is for iron firmness. No settlement with Japan that in any way seems to the American people, or to the rest of the world, to be a retreat, no matter how temporary, from our increasingly clear policy of opposition to aggressors, will be viewed as consistent with the position of our government or with the leadership that you have established. Certainly the independence of the millions of brave people in China who have been carrying on their fight for four long, hard years against Japanese aggression is of no lena concern to us and to the world than the independence of Thailand or French Indo-China. No matter what explanation is offered the public of a "truce" with Japan the American people, the Chinese people, and the oppressed peoples of Europe, as well as those forces in Britain and Russia who are with us in this fight, will regard it as a confession of American weakness and vacillation. How else can the world possibly interpret a relaxation of the economic pressure which you have so painstakingly built up in order to force Japan to abandon her policy of aggression when that relaxation is undertaken not because Japan actually abandoned it, but only because she promises not to extend her aggressive acts to other countries? The parallel with Munich is inescapable.
The continuation and further intensification of our economic pressure against Japan seems, in the light of all the opinions I have sounded out, to be the touchstone of our pledge to China and the world that the United States will oppose Japanese aggression in the Pacific.
Pressure exerted by Communist sympathizers in the Institute of Pacific Relations must also be taken into account when analyzing the reasons for the rejection of a truce with Japan. On November 25, Professor Owen Lattimore of Johns Hopkins University, the United States' special advisor to Chiang Kai-shek, dispatched an anxious cable to Presidential Assistant Lauchlin Currie arguing against any agreement between the United States and Japan on a modus vivendi:
After discussing with the Generalissimo the Chinese Ambassador's conference with the Secretary of State, I feel you should urgently advise the President of the Generalissimo's very strong reaction. I have never seen him really agitated before. Loosening of economic pressure or unfreezing would dangerously increase Japan's military advantage in China. A relaxation of American pressure while Japan has its forces in China would dismay the Chinese. Any Modus Vivendi now arrived at with China would be disastrous to Chinese belief in America and analogous to the closing of the Burma Road, which permanently destroyed British prestige. Japan and Chinese defeatists would instantly exploit the resulting disillusionment and urge oriental solidarity against occidental treachery. It is doubtful whether either past assistance or increasing aid could compensate for the feeling of being deserted at this hour. The Generalissimo has deep confidence in the President's fidelity to his consistent policy but I must warn you that even the Generalissimo questions his ability to hold the situation together if the Chinese national trust in America is undermined by reports of Japan's escaping military defeat by diplomatic victory.
Lattimore, by this one act, designed to accomplish the Soviet objective of promoting war between the United States and Japan — did more to promote the Sovietization of Chinathan in any other act of his career. All Communist schemes for conquest of China hinged upon destroying the balance of power in the Pacific.
Barring extreme alertness on the partogAmerican officials, the "mopping-up" operation could be accomplished fairly simply. In August, 1941, Carter wrote Currie asking if letters to Lattimore in China could be transmitted so that "they are not read by others before reaching him." Currie promptly replied on a White House letterhead that "I will be glad to get the letters you mentioned to Lattimore uncensored." Currie's assistant in the White House a Michael Greenberg, a British alien, who later bacame an American citizen and supplied information to a spy ring.[64-A]
On the same day Harry White sent "an urgent telegram" to Edward Carter of the Institute of Pacific Relations asking him to "come to Washington." When he arrived the following morning White assured him "that everything was all right" and "that every friend of China could be satisfied." On that day Secretary Hull changed his mind and decided to "kick the whole thing over" because Chiang Kai-shek felt that modus vivendi proposal "would make a terrifically bad impression in China." Hull declared later that he dropped the modus vivendi proposal largely because "the Chinese Government violently opposed the idea." He testified: "It developed that the conclusion with Japan of such an arrangement would have been a major blow to Chinese morale." There was a "serious risk of collapse of Chinese morale and resistance, and even of disintegration of China." In light of this fact it "became perfectly evident that the modus vivendi aspect would not be feasible." The cable from Owen Lattimore to Lauchlin Currie, dated November 25, was the only documental evidence which Cordell Hull presented in defense of his rejection of the modus vivendi.
The question arises here as to whether the Chinese did reject this proposal. The Chinese Ambassador denied his Government "was blocking the putting into effect of a temporary arrangement which might afford a cooling-off spell in the Far Eastern situation."
After reviewing the Far Eastern situation Admiral Stark and General Marshall recommended that "no ultimatum be delivered to Japan." Nevertheless, Hull went ahead and dropped the truce idea. Then he told Secretary of War Stimson: "I have washed my hands of it and it is now inthe hands of you and Knox — the Army and the Navy." Hull must have known that war between the United States and Japan was inevitable now.
The part that Currie played in influencing the rejection of a truce with the Japanese can be judged by his precipitate actions. On November 28, when he lunched with Edward C. Carter, Secretary-General to the Pacific Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, he was no longer worried. Hull had made up his mind to "kick the modus vivendi over," and on November 26 he submitted to the Japanese Ambassador ten conditions which Japan found represented so stiff a price for peace that war was now a foregone conclusion.
"I should think" Carter noted on November 29, "that Currie probably had a terribly anxious time for the past week. For a few days it looked as though Hull was in danger of selling China and America and Britain down the river." But now everything was all right. What Joseph C. Grew called "an utterly futile war" with Japan was now directly ahead.
On the afternoon of November 26, 1941, Secretary Hull abandoned all thought of a truce with Japan and put in final shape the ten-point ultimatum to Japan. Both he and the President knew this program would be rejected by Japan. The Japanese Ambassadors were given an ultimatum reading: "The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indo-China." Both Ambassadors were aghast at the "sudden change of attitude."
It is very significant that the ultimatum presented by Hull to the Japanese was based upon an explosive memorandum written a memorandum embodying his views in May, 1941. This document of May, 1941, with its lavish bounty to the Japanese business class, would have made a certain bizarre sense. By November, the business class no longer had political power, and the United States was dealing with the military, which was oblivious to the yen's international value. As the Hull-Nomura negotiations moved towards a climax, White twice redrafted his May, 1941 document.
On November 18, 1941, Secretary Morgenthau sent to Secretary Hull a long memorandum drafted by Mr. White with reference to the terms for peace that should be presented to Japan. These terms were so stiff that White knew that Japan could not accept them. He was anxious for war between Japan and the United States because such a conflict would relieve Japanese pressure upon Russia's Far Eastern flank. Russia had over 200,000 men facing Japan in the Far East. These troops were desperately needed in the war against Germany.
On November 19, Maxwell Hamilton, Chief of the Far Eastern Division of the Department of State, revised the White memorandum to a slight degree. He found the memorandum "the most constructive one which I have yet seen." Secretary Hull had both the White memorandum and the Maxwell revision before him when he drafted the ultimatum of November 26. It is significant that in this ultimatum eight of the drastic demands of the White memorandum found a place. In other words, Harry Dexter White, a Soviet agent, helped in an important, even decisive, way to draft the ultimatum that provoked war between Japan and the United States. This was a primary Soviet aim in the Far East.
Morgenthau was fearful that the American public would not like the way he had helped to precipitate war between the United States and Japan, and it was significant that he refused to permit investigators to look at his diary for December 7, 1941. It is unlikely that the dairy entries for that date will be read for many years.
With reference to the Communist drive to involve the United States and Japan in a war, the followingremarks by Benjamin Gitlow, a devoted Communist before breaking with the Party, are pertinent:
As far back as 1927 when I was in Moscow, the attitude toward the United States in the event of war was discussed. Privately, it was the opinion of all the Russian leaders to whom I spoke that the rivalry between the United States and Japan must actually break out into war between these two.
The Russians were hopeful that the war would break out soon, because that would greatly secure the safety of Russian Siberian borders and would so weaken Japan that Russia would no longer have to fear an attack from her in the East. Stalin's hopes, through the activities of the Anerican Communist Party, to create a public opinion in the United States that would favor a war, presumably in defense of democracy against the encroachment of Fascism, but actually Japan. Stalin is perfectly willing to let Americans die in defense of the Soviet Union even if they are not members of the Commumist Party...."
Neither Roosevelt nor Hull believed that the Japanese would accept the termsembodied in the American note of November 26. Why, then, did they submit it? Could it be that they meant to provoke Japan to attack the United States so that the latter migbt get into war with Germanyby the "back door?" This is the thesis followed by some of our best historians today.
Vice Admiral Frank E. Beatty, who was an aide to Frank Knox and very close to the inner circle in the White House, remarked:
Prior to December 7, it was evident even to me... that we were pushingJapan into a corner. I believed that it was the desireof Presdient Roosevelt, and Prime Minister Churchillthat we get into the war, as they felt the Allies could not win without us and ail our efforts to cause the Germans to declare war on us failed: the conditions we imposed upon Japan — to get out of China, for example — were so severe that we knew that nation could not accept them. We were forcing her so severely that we could have known that she would react toward the United States. All her preparations in a military way — and we knew their over-all import — pointed that way.
Secretary Hull certainly made it clear that unless Japan accepted his ten-point ultimatum economy pressure upon her would continue. Japan was faced with an alternative of making a public surrender of all she had for years been building in the Far East. At this time, Japan was deeply committed in China. Her expenditures for carrying out the war in China had been very high. The bulk of her national wealth was tied up in the China effort. As Captain J. C. Wylle has noted:
If they had chosen to get out of China, I do not see how they could have avoided an internal revolution, No power clique such as the one that ruled Japan will ever abdicate (and that would have been the result of getting out of China); and even it they had done so, their successor would have come to power in opposition to any such course.
If Japan had withdrawn her troops from China as Hull's note demanded, Japan would have lost her position as a stabilizing power against Russia. The Red tide had begun to flow rapidly over the vast plains of Manchuria. Japan was the only power that was able to build bastions of defense to stop it. But the Department of State refused to regard Japan as a bulwark against Soviet expansion in North China. As a matter of tact, not one protost was sent by the Department of State against the Soviet Union despite her absorption of Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia, while at the same time, Japan was censured for stationing troops in China.
The day after delivering his note to the Japanese Ambassadors, Hull remarked to Stimson that he had "broken the whole matter off" and that it was now "in the hands... of the Army and the Navy." The talking was over and the shooting would begin. On the 25th of November, Stimson had stated the problem as one of "how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot." Secretary Hull had solved the problem the very next day. This was the conclusion of the Army Pearl Harbor Board when it reported that the Hull note "touched the button that started the war."
When the American note arrived in Tokyo on November 27, high Japanese officials were "dumbfounded' at its severity and agreed that it indicated America's determination to go to war with Japan. In the words of Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori, one of the most moderate members of the Government: "I was utterly disheartened, and felt like one groping in darkness. The uncompromising tone was no more than I had looked for; but I was greatly astonished at the extreme nature of the contents." It was obvious that the next step was war.
The war against Japan upset the whole structure of the international balance of power in Asia. The United Statea destroyed the one power that was able to check the flow of that Red tide in the Far Eaat. When Japanese statesmen watched with apprehension the movement of this Red tide accross North China they moved their armies into Manchus and Inner Mongolia to serve as dydes to restrain this menacing Soviet advance. Secretaries Stimson and Hull refused to face the plain realities of the Far Eastern situation and they entered upon a policy of the destruction of the Japanese Empire. With the fall of Japan the last barrier to Russian domination of the Far East was removed. Deprived of her influence in China, and with her cities and industries destroyed, Japan, at the end of the war, was back where she starred at dawn of her modern era.
The present Soviet military might, which threatens our national security, is the direct product of billions of lend-lease aid, coddling of Communists in high places in the American Government and failure to understand the basic drives of world Communism. The present sawdust Caesar, Khrushchev, can insult at will the President of the United States and can hurl continual threats to "bury" all Americans. Never before in our history was Presidential leadership so devoid of vision and never before had the mistakes of our Chief Executive been so fraught with peril to our nation.
1. Louis F. Budenz, The Techniques of Communism, (Chicago: Henry Regnery and Company, 1954), pp. 162-163.
3. China: The March toward Unity, Address "The 15th Anniversary of the Communist Party of China" by Georgi Dimitov, pp. 83-87. Italics mine.
4. Testimony of Lauchlin Currie, August 13, 1948. Hearings Regarding Communist Espionage in the United States Government. Hearings before the Committee on Un-American Activities. U. S. Congress, House, 80th Congress, Second Session (Washington: Government Printing office, 1948) Part I, p. 852.
5. New York Times, July 23, 1939.
6. Testimony of Edward C. Carter, July 25, 1951, U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Internal Security Subcommittee, Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, 82nd Congress, First Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), Part I, p. 133.
7. Testimony of Stanley K. Hornbeck, February 15, 1952. Ibid., Part 9, pp. 3209-10.
8. Mr. Lauchlin Currie to President Roosevelt, May 6, 1941. Foreign Relations, 1941, Vol. V, 644.
9. President Roosevelt to Secretary Hull, May 19, 1941, Ibid., p. 644n.
10. Secretary Hull to President Roosevelt, May 21, 1941. Ibid., p. 648.
11. Secretary Hull to Ambassador Gauss, May 29, 1941, Ibid., p. 651.
12. Edward C. Carter to Philip C; Jessup, June 23, 1941. Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 9, p. 3264. Three days previously Dr. Carter wrote Lattimore apropos the luncheon with Oumansky: "If you have time while in San Fransisco, yon and Bill Holland may want to arrange a private talk with Col. Philip R. Faymonville whose present address is Headquartera of the Fourth Army, Presidio of San Francisco, Calif. "He would, I think, have been thoroughly at home and at ease if he had lunched with us at the Mayflower on Wednesday; I think you get the idea.'-Ibid.. p. 3263. Colonel, later General, Faymonville, long had an interest in Russia. He was ordnance officer to General Graves. He was senior military aide to President Roosevelt in 1933 and 1934. From 1934 to 1939 he was United Statea Military Attache in Moscow. He shared Ambassador Davies' view concerning the Moscow trials. He said the Soviet Union has "no desire" to conquer other nations. Communist Parties created in non-Soviet areas "have nothing to do with the Russians." He said: "The Soviet Union is completely sincere in backing global cooperation. Its leaders want an organized and peaceful world." Ralph Izard, "A General Looks at the Soviet Union," Our Times, People's Daily World (February 18. 1949) 12, No. 35, Section 2; Institute of Paciffic Relations, Hearings, Part 10, pp. 3700-3703.
13. President Roosevelt to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, June 23, 1941. Foreign Relations, 1941 V, 668.
14. Testimony of William Montgomery McGovern, September 28, 1951. Institute of Paciffic Relations, Hearings. Part 4, pp. 1010-1011.
15. Owen Lattimore to E C. Carter, July 10, 1938. Ibid.. Part 1, p. 40.
16. Testimony of Alexander Barmine, July 31, 1951. Ibid., Part 1, pp. 199-200.
17. Testimony of Louis Francis Budenz, August 22, 1951. Ibid., Part 2, pp. 522-23.
18. Ibid., Part 9, p. 3265.
19. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Drumright), June 30, 1941. Foreign Relations, 1941, V, 520.
20. Ambassador Ott to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, Far Eastern Military Tribunal, Document No. 4074.
21. Ambassador Ott to German Foreign Ministry, May 6, 1941, Ibid., Exhibit No. 1068; Defense Document No. 1500; excerpts from diary of K. A. Smetanin, the Soviet Ambassador, April 25, 1941, Ibid., Document No. 1886.
22. Ibid., p. 7955; Document No. 879, p. 52; For an excellent analysis of Matsuoka'a policy over the German-Russian War, see Interrogation of Kido, Ibid., pp. 494-499.
23. "American and British Phase: Summary of Proof," Ibid., p. 61. Also Ribbentrop to Ott, Berlin, June 28, 1941, Ibid., Document No. 4097.
24. Ambassador Ott to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, Tokyo, July 3, 1941, Ibid., Document No. 4062.
25. "Matsuoka was opposed to the 'southern advance' on the ground that it would jeopardizerelations with Great Britain and the United States." Toshikazu Kaze,Journey to the "Missouri." (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 48.
26. "Kido's Diary," Far Eastern Military Tribunal (Manuscript). Document No. 1632; intercepted message from Tokyo to Nomura, August 20, 1941, Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 12, pp. 18-19.
27. Far Eastern Military Tribunal, Defense Document No. 1652; "Tojo Memorandum," Ibid., Record pp. 31254-58; "Konoye's Memoirs," Appendix III, Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 20, pp. 4018-19. A neutrality pact between the Soviet Union and Japan was signed in Moscow on April 13, 1941; for text, CF Department of State Bulletin, April 29, 1945, p. 812.
28. President Roosevelt followed the debate through the medium of "Magic" — a name applied to intercepted and decoded Japanese messages. He described the Imperial Conference as "a real drag-down and knockout fight... to decide which way they were going to jump — attack Russia, attack the South Seas (or) sit on the fence and be more friendly with us." President Roosevelt to Secretary Ickes, July 1, 1941 cited in William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared War, 1940-41, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), p. 646.
29. Testimony of Major General Charles A. Willoughby, August 9, 1951, Institute of Paciffic Relations, Hearings, Part 2, pp. 363-364; p. 505.
30. Testimony of Mitsusada Yoshikawa, August 20, 1951, Institute of Pacific Relations. Part 2, p. 504. Ozaki was unofficial adviser to the Konoye Cabinet, 1938-39. As a friend of Konoye and of Konoye's private secretaries, Ushiba and Kishi, Ozaki knew all about the decisions of the Japanese Cabinet and Liaison Conferences. Therefore, especially from 1938 to October, 1941, Moscow knew fully and accurately about Japanese political decisions and intentions; it also received a wealth of military and economic data. See Charles A,. Willoughby, Shanghai Conspiracy: The Sorge Spy Ring (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1952), pp. 33-39.
31. Far Eastern Military Tribunal, Defense Document No. 1486.
32. U.S. Congress, House of REpresentatives, Committee on Un-American Activities, Hearings on American Aspects of the Richard Sorge Spy Case, 82nd Congress, First Session, (Washingotn: Government Printing Office, 1951) pp. 1198-99.
33. V. Kravchenko, I Chose Freedom (New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1950), p. 377-378.
34. Ambassador Grew to Secretary Hull, Tokyo, August 18, 1941. Japan: 1931-1941, II, p. 565.
35. Ambassador Grew to Secretary Hull, August 19, 1941. Foreign Relations, 1941, IV, pp. 382-383. The imposition of the embargo on exports of oil in the previous month was looked upon by the Japanese as a "severance of economic relations." Former Ambassador Nomura has characterized the action as "a step just short of war." Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, "Stepping-Stones to War," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, LXXVII (September, 1951), No. 9, p. 930.
36. The Japan Foreign Office to Ambassador Nomura. August 26, 1941. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 12, p. 20.
37. The Japanese Prime Minister (Prince Konoye) to President Roosevelt, August 27, 1941. Japan: 1931-1941, II, 573.
38. President Roosevelt's reply to the Japanese Prime Minister (Prince Konoye), Handed to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on September 3, 1941. Ibid., p. 591.
39. Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945 (Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1952), II, 1255.
40. Ibid., p. 1264,
41. Ibid., p. 1343.
42. Ibid., p. 1330.
43. Ibid., p. 1334.
44. Ambassador Grew to President Roosevelt, September 22, 1941. Foreign Relations, 1941, IV, 468. The risk to Prince Konoye's life was real, not imaginary. On September 10, "an attempt on Prince Konoye'e life wee made by four men who jumped on the running board of his car with daggers and short swords as he was about to leave his private residence at Ogikubo. Fortunately the doors of the car were locked inside and the would-be assassins were quickly conquered by plainclothes police." Grew, Turbulent Era, II, 1332.
45. Ambassador Grew to President Roosevelt, September 22, 1941. Foreign Relations, 1941, IV, 469.
46. Memorandum by Mt. Joseph W. Ballantine, September 25, 1941. Ibid., p. 479. The pro arguments were summarized, as follows: A Roosevelt-Konoye meeting would indicate that Japan was drawing away from the Axis and that she questioned Germany'a ability to win the war in Europe. The war-weary people of Japan would welcome a normalization of relations between the two countries. The result might strengthen the hands of those who seek to lead Japan in the way to peace and cooperation with the democratic nations. The meeting would give an evidence that the United States bore no hostility toward the Japanese Government or people. The President would be able to explain his views and purposes face to face with the Japanese Prime Minister. Ibid., pp. 478-479.
47. Memorandum by Lauchlin Currie to President Roosevelt, September 13, 1941, as quoted by Langer and Gleaaon, The Undeclared War, 1940-1941, p. 710.
48. Memorandum by Joseph W. Ballantine, September 25, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, IV, 479-480.
49. Grew, Turbulent Era, II, 1350.
50. Memorandum by Joseph W. Ballantine, September 25, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, IV, 480.
51. Oral statement handed by Secretary Hull to Ambassador Nomura, October 2, 1941, Japan: 1931-1941, pp. 656-661.
52. The Japanese Foreign Office to Ambassador Nomura. October 3, 1941, Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 12, p. 51.
53. Owen Lattimore, American Political Advisor to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, to Mr. Lauchlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to President Roosevelt, November 2, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, V, p. 747.
54. Ambassador Gauss to President Roosevelt, November 19, 1941. Ibid., p. 550.
55. Testimony of General Charles A. Willoughby, August 9, 1951. Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 2, p. 382.
56. Undated, White House, MS. Princeton University.
57. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 14, p. 1142. Paul W. Schroeder in his interesting analysis of our relations with Japan for the year 1941, says until "the middle of July, 1941, the policy of Japan was unmistakably aggressive in nature." The Americanpositionin this same period was definitely defensive. After July, 1941, America went on a diplomatic offensive with constant economic pressure being used as a weapon to push Japan back, to compel her to withdraw from her conquests. On the other hand, Japan, after freezing orders, was hesitant, worried, and in retreat. Her main objective was "somehow to extricate herself from the desperate position in which she was entangled, to get relief from the inexorable economic pressure of the embargo, and to avoid what seemed to be inevitable war." The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Relations, 1941, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1958) Chapter VIII.
58. On November 22, 1941, Washington officials intercepted a message from Tokyo to the Japanese Embassy. It extended Japan's deadline from November 25 to November 29, but warned that thereafter "things are automatically going to happen." Pearl Harbor Attack, Part12, p. 165.
59. Italics mine. Henry L Stimson's Diary, November 25, 1941, Ibid., Part II, p. 5433. Richard Current in "How Stimson Meant to 'Maneuver' the Japanese" says, "The fact that the President and his advisers on November 25 did not expect the Japanese soon to strike at American territory was precisely the reason why the question 'how we should maneuver them into the position of tiring the first shot' was such a 'difficult proposition.' Since the Japanese were not thought likely to initiate hostilities against the United States itself, the problem was how to put them in a position of seeming to fire the 'first shot' at this country." Mississippi Valley Historical Review (June. 1953), p. 74. Dr. Harry Elmer Barnes, in his review of Secretary Stimson points out the fallacy in Current's argument. "The only weak spot in Professor Current's book lies in his treatment of the attitude of Roosevelt and his entourage in the days immediately preceding Pearl Harbor.... There is no doubt that the White House and the warmongering strategists in the Cabinet were panic-stricken for a time over this possibility of having to make war without any Japanese attack.... But this alarm passed away with the receipt of the welcome news (decoded Japanese messages) which revealed, as clearly as daylight, that the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor.... By the evening of December 5th, the Japanese reply to Hull's ultimatum of November 26th convinced Roosevelt that war with Japan was about to break out." Facts Forum News, February, 1956, p. 50. For other interpretations of Stimson's statement Cf. Charles Beard, President Roosevelt and the Comming of the War, 1941 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948). Chapter XVII; Charles C. Tansil, Back Door to War (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952), pp. 645-652; George Morgenstern, Pearl Harbor (New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1947), Chapter XIX. Roosevelt's fear was not that Japan would attack the United States. but that she might not.
60. Final Draft of Proposed "Modus Vivendi" with Japan, November 25, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, IV, pp. 662-664.
61. Pearl Harbor Attack. Part 39, p. 502; Part 2, p. 5177; Part 3, p. 1149.
62. Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, November 26, 1941. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 14, p. 1300. See also Mr. Churchill's views in The Grand Alliance, pp. 595-597, (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1950). For a description of the attitude ofCongresssee Admiral Stark's testimony in Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 5, pp. 2327 ff. For complaints by Chinese officials see Ibid., Part 14, p. 1161; 1167-1170.
63. White MS, Princeton University.
64. Owen Lattimore to Lauchlin Currie, November 25, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, Vol. IV, p. 652.
64-A. Washington Times-Herald, April 15, 1951, p. 5. See also Elizabeth Bentley's testimony in Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 2, Exhibit No. 111, 112, pp. 433-434. Currie has established residence in South America after spy disclosures in 1948 placed him in the Silvermaster espionage cell.
65. Testimony of E. C. Carter, July 25, 1951. Ibid.. Part 1, pp. 153-154.
66. "The Stimson Diary," November 26, 1941. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 11, p. 5434.
67. Testimony of Cordell Hull, November 23, 1945. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 2, 434-435 and Unnumbered Volume, pp. 36-37.
68. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton), December 1, 1941. Foreign Relations. 1941, IV, 702. Chiang Kai-shek did urge the American Government not to "relax the economic blockade and freezing of Japanese assets" until the question of Japanese evacuation was settled. The telegram was sent to T. V. Soong on November 25, but waa not transmitted to the Department of State until December 2. Foreign Relations, 1941, 1V, 660-661.
69. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 14, pp. 1061-1062; Part 16. pp. 2222-2223.
70. Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 1, p. 157.
71. Oral statement handed by Secretary Hull to Ambassador Nomura and Kurusu, November 26, 1941, Japan: 1931-1941, II, 766-70.
72. Far Eastern Military Tribunal, Document No. 3105.
73. Robert Morris, No Wonder We Are Losing (New York: The Bookmailer, 1958), p. 133.
74. Memorandum by Secretary Morgenthau, November 17, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, IV, pp. 606-613. White'e known relation with Currie and one of the Hiss brothers at this time is altogether improbable that he would have acted except in collaboration with them, and at their instigation. He had heard his draft was being tampered with in the State Department, as indeed it was, and wished to have the tampering stopped.
75. Maxwell Hamilton to Secretary Hull, November 19, 1941, Ibid., pp. 622-625. Admiral Stark considered the White memorandum acceptable to the Navy and Lee Gerow, acting in General Marahall's absence, said the White plan would attain "one of our present major objectives — the avoidance of war with Japan." Alexander Deconde, Isolation and Security (Durham: Duke University Press, 1957), p. 154.
76. The thesis is this: Since 1933 one of the main objectives in Soviet policy had been to maneuver America into war with Japan. Japan was a serious threat to Soviet desires in the Far East. If her power were broken, there would be no difficulty in realizing Soviet objectives in Asia. The Roosevelt Administration wittingly or unwittingly followed the Soviet line, and Harry Dexter White, an important and trusted official in the Administration, drafted a note to Japan that produced the war for which Roosevelt had long been looking.
77. New Yorker, October 26, 1946, p. 24.
78. Benjamin Gitlow, I Confess (New York: E P. Dutton, Inc., 1940), pp. 485-486.
79. Among them are Tansill, Morgenstern, Beard, Grenfell,Sanborn, and Barnes. Harold Ickes, Secretary of Interior, wrote in his diary in October, 1941: "For a long time I have believed that our best entrance into the war would be by way of Japan... Japan has no friends in this countrv, but China has. And of course if we go to war against Japan, it will inevitably lead us into war against Germany." The Secret Diary of Harold Ickes (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954),III, p. 630. For an excellent analysis of Roosevelt's Foreign Policy see Perpetual War for Pepetual Peace, Edited by Harry Elmer Barnes (Caldwell, Idabo: Caxton Printers, 1953).
80. Vice Admiral Frank E. Beatty, "Another Version of What Started the War with Japan," U. S. News and World Report, May 28, 1954, p. 48.
81. Captain J. C. Wylie, Jr., "Reflections on the War in the Pacific," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, 78 (April, 1952), 352.
82. "The Explanation of the Foreign Minister at Imperial Conference," December 1, 1941, Far Eastern Military Tribunal, Record p. 26092.
83. Ibid., p. 26101. According to Alexander Barmine, who was in charge of the supply of Soviet arms, by 1935, Sinkiang had become "a Soviet colony in all but name." One Who Survived (NewYork: G. P.Putnam's Sons, 1945), pp. 231-232.
84. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 11, pp. 5434-5435.
85. As Stimson explained: "In spite of the risk involved... in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that in order to have the full support of the American people, it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this so that there should remain no doubt in anyone's mind as to who were the aggressors." Stimson's Testimony quoted in Basil Rauch, Roosevelt from Munich to Pearl Harbor (New York: Creative Age, 1950), p. 473.
86. Pearl Harbor Attack. Part 39, p. 137. Churchill has since written that the Hull ultimatum "not only met our wishes and those of the associated governments, but indeed went beyond anything we had ventured to ask." Churchill, TheGrand Alliance (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950), p. 597.
87. Togo Shigenori, The Cause of Japan (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956), p. 176.